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RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
Gregory E. Maggsf
3. What are the lessons from detaining non-U.S. citizens, labeled enemy
combatants, at Gitmo?
The United States has undoubtedly drawn many lessons from
detaining enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but I will
address only three of them. I have singled out these three because,
in my view, they are unfortunate lessons for the United States to
have learned and because they have received surprisingly little
public attention.
The first lesson learned is that the United States should not
take prisoners in the war on terror.' Put simply, the United States
has discovered through hard experience that the Nation is
generally better off if its military and intelligence forces do not
detain enemy combatants. Although capturing our enemies and
holding them prisoner may incapacitate them and may yield useful
intelligence, detaining terrorist suspects ultimately comes at a
prohibitively high cost. Since 2001, the Government has become
embroiled in enormous litigation over detainee issues, with no end
to the lawsuits in sight. It has spent stupendous sums in
constructing and maintaining detention facilities. And as anyone
t Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, the
George Washington University Law School. In addition to my academic positions,
I am also an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve. In this capacity, I have worked on
various national security matters, including issues concerning the trial of enemy
combatants for war crimes. The views expressed in this publication are my own.
They do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or the Department of
Defense.
1. The discussion of this lesson builds upon an earlier essay that I have
written, Gregory E. Maggs, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 971, 999-1006 (2007). I have included some of the same citations to
support my assertions.
2. See Warren Richey, Can U.S. Judges Order Detainees Released?, CHRSTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Nov. 25, 2008, at 25 (reporting that the United States is litigating more
than 200 habeas corpus cases).
3. See Alan Gomez, Pentagon Touts Progress at Gitmo Facility, USA TODAY, Dec.
12, 2008, at A10 (reporting that the detention facilities alone cost more than $400
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who reads the newspapers knows, despite all of this effort, the
United States has subjected itself to unending domestic and
international criticism for its treatment of detainees at
Guantanamo.
In recognition of the burdens and costs associated with
detainees, the United States has decided to change the way it fights
terrorism. In January 2005, U.S. Army Colonel Gary Cheek, then
the U.S. Commander for Eastern Afghanistan, described a new
policy that runs contrary to customary thinking about how to win
wars: "I've told our commanders, for example, to minimize the
number of Afghan nationals or others that they detain."4
According to the Washington Post, "[t]he U.S. military is taking as
few prisoners as possible in its campaign against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan, in part to forestall [more] complaints
about its conduct.' 5 Indeed, the United States has not transferred
new prisoners to Guantanamo in more than five years. 6 It is a safe
bet that the United States will not move any more terrorist suspects
there in the future.
Perhaps the United States should have learned not to take
prisoners sooner. Whenever you hear complaints about how the
United States has handled Guantanamo, you might ask yourself
what America's most loyal NATO allies-those who have been
fighting beside the United States in Afghanistan for seven years-
are doing with their prisoners. Where is the French equivalent of
Guantanamo where French forces hold their captured detainees?
And where are the German, Dutch, or Canadian detainee facilities?
Do any of the domestic courts of these countries have jurisdiction
over the detainees? Have there been allegations of abuse or calls
for release of their prisoners?
These are all fine questions, but they have no answers for a
simple reason: our NATO allies have been wise enough not to take
and hold prisoners in Afghanistan.7  They have avoided this
million).
4. World in Brief: US. Military Is Directed to Take Fewer Prisoners in Afghanistan,
WASH. PoST, Jan. 4, 2005, at Al2.
5. Id.
6. See Tim Golden, U.S. Says it Fears Detainee Abuse in Repatriation, N.Y. TIES,
Apr. 30, 2006, at 1 (reporting that the last new detainees were transferred into
Guantanamo on September 22, 2004).
7. See David Bosco, A Duty NA TO Is Dodging in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Nov.
5, 2006, at B7 ("NATO countries have essentially opted out of the detainee
business. Before committing their troops to combat areas, the Canadian, Dutch
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controversial task and consequently have not endured the
concomitant hazards, controversy, expense, and litigation.8 Only
the United States made the blunder of thinking that it should take
prisoners in this war. But surely it has learned its lesson now.
Is the new policy of not taking prisoners something to
celebrate? Opponents of the United States' counterterrorism
policies initially might think so. After all, their mounting of
criticism and filing of lawsuits helped to achieve this result. But if
critics have welcomed the new approach, perhaps they did not
think through all of the consequences.
In my view, the United States' decision not to take prisoners
has not been an improvement for anyone. As the United States has
been driven to stop taking and holding enemy combatants as
prisoners, it has put more emphasis on alternatives. Perhaps the
most important of these alternatives is targeted killing. Rather than
capturing al Qaeda kingpins, the United States dispatches them
with guided missiles and bombs.9 Or the United States simply plans
military operations that use such overwhelming firepower that no
enemies will survive. ' 0
Think of the consequences: unlike the detainees at
Guantanamo, the suspects who are targeted and killed receive no
combatant status hearings to determine whether they really are
fighters, no determination of their guilt of war crimes, and no
habeas corpus rights." They just receive the death penalty. Yet,
surprisingly, for whatever reason, the United States generally gets a
"pass" in public relations. The killing of a suspected al Qaeda
leader may make the news for a few days-usually accompanied by
celebratory editorials, even from what are otherwise the most
and British governments signed agreements with the Afghan Government stating
that any captured fighters would be handed over to Afghan authorities rather than
to American forces.").
8. See id. ("[T]hey don't want any part of the prisoner scandals that have
dogged American forces.").
9. For a more detailed discussion of targeted killing, see Maggs, supra note
1, at 1001-03. See also Peter M. Cullen, The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign
Against Terror, 48 JOINT FORCE Q. 22 (2008); Daniel Byman, Targeted Killing,
American Style, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at B13; Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of
Drones in Terror War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al.
10. See Maggs, supra note 1, at 1002-03 (discussing military press releases that
describe these tactics).
11. See Douglass W. Cassel, Targeted Killings: What We Don't Know, CHI. DAILY L.
BuLL., Feb. 28, 2007, at 6.
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questioning newspapers." After a day or so in the news, no one
ever hears about the killing again.
Another alternative to taking prisoners is to turn them over to
Afghan authorities." Again, this is not necessarily an improvement:
Can you think of anyone who would rather be held in an Afghan
prison than the safe and now heavily scrutinized facilities at
Guantanamo? But still no one complains; for purposes of public
relations, leaving detainees in someone else's hands has clearly
turned out to be preferable.
Finally, the United States has resorted to the alternative of
simply letting many of its prisoners go free. This practice may
make for good media coverage, but it is extremely dangerous. In
his dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Scalia described some of
the consequences of freeing Guantanamo detainees:
At least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from
Guantanamo Bay have returned to the
battlefield.... Some have been captured or
killed.... But others have succeeded in carrying on
their atrocities against innocent civilians. In one
case, a detainee released from Guantanamo Bay
masterminded the kidnapping of two Chinese dam
workers, one of whom was later shot to death ....
Another former detainee promptly.., murdered a
United Nations engineer and three Afghan
soldiers .... Still another murdered an Afghan
judge .... [Another] released detainee carried out a
suicide bombing against Iraqi soldiers in Mosul,
Iraq. 14
Because the United States thoroughly has learned the lesson
not to take or hold prisoners, we can expect more releases. Their
post-detention conduct is likely also to be harmful. Yet, despite all
of the violence and death that results, calls for releasing the
Guantanamo prisoners continue to pressure the United States.
12. Editorial, A Good Day in Iraq, WASH. PosT, Jun. 9, 2006, at A22 (cheering
the United States' targeted killing of Abu Musab ai-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda
in Iraq).
13. See Matthew Waxman, Beyond Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at
A17 (describing agreement to turn detainees over to Afghan authorities).
14. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294-95 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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A second lesson that the United States has learned from
detaining enemy combatants at Guantanamo is not to rely on
Supreme Court precedent. The Department of Defense used to
take the Supreme Court's word very seriously. In December 2001,
shortly after the President issued his executive order directing that
enemy combatants be tried by military commission, 5 I received
orders as an Army Reserve judge advocate to report to the
Pentagon. Over several months, both on active duty and in a
reserve status, I took part in a team effort to devise rules for military
commissions. Like everyone else involved, I dutifully read and
analyzed what appeared to be the leading precedents on the
treatment of enemy war criminals: Quirin,6  Yamashita,7
Eisentrager, and so forth.
In retrospect, we were awfully naive to think that these old
decisions would matter much. Although a plurality partly relied on
Quiin in Hamdi,19 the Supreme Court gave almost no weight to
Quiin, Yamashita, and Eisentrager in Rasul,20 Hamdan, and
Boumediene.2 The Court, to be sure, did not expressly overrule any
of these decisions. Instead, in one case after another, the Court
cleverly distinguished them, 3 deemed them to have been already
24overruled by other cases or new treaties, or characterized features
15. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
16. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding trial of Nazi saboteurs by
military commission).
17. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (upholding conviction of Japanese
military officer for war crimes despite challenges to the charged crime and
procedures).
18. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (concluding that the federal
courts did not have jurisdiction over German war criminals, convicted of war
crimes by a military commission in China and then transferred to Germany).
19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that the United States has authority to detain enemy combatants
captured in the war on terror).
20. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding the federal habeas corpus
statute, as then written, reached detainees held at Guantanamo).
21. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (exercising habeas corpus
jurisdiction over detainee at Guantanamo and striking down plans to try him by
military commission).
22. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that the detainees
at Guantanamo have a constitutional right to habeas corpus).
23. See, e.g., id. at 2257 (distinguishing Eisentrager based on differences
between Landsberg Prison in post-war occupied Germany and the detention
facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
24. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 617-18 (concluding that "[t]he force of [the
Yamashita] precedent . .. has been seriously undermined by post-World War II
2009] 5083
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• 25of the cases as non-essential to their holdings. But however the
Court may have described its recent decisions, the Department of
Defense surely no longer views the Court's precedents regarding
detainees in the same way. It has learned the lesson that the
Supreme Court is not simply interpreting prior decisions. On the
contrary, the Court is actively setting and resetting the United
States' detainee policy. I would not be surprised if its attorneys now
ask themselves questions such as: What would Justice Kennedy (the
author of Boumediene) think? Or what would Justice Stevens (the
author of Hamdan) say?
The third important lesson is that the United States stands
alone in the world when it comes to the application of the law of
war and humanitarian law issues, especially with respect to
detainees. Our enemies-members of al Qaeda and the Taliban-
do not follow these laws and no one expects them to do so. And
our allies, with rare exceptions, do not take and hold prisoners. So
the laws do not generally apply to them. When issues arise, in
courts or in international discussions, they almost always involve the
United States. Because other nations have different political and
diplomatic agendas, and do not share the United States' military
burdens, the United States has learned that it cannot expect them
to interpret the laws of war and humanitarian laws in exactly the
same ways that it does.
4. What is left for the Supreme Court to decide after the Boumediene
decision?
The Supreme Court left open several questions in Boumediene.
Most notably, while the Court decided that federal courts may
assert habeas corpus jurisdiction over all of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Supreme Court did not determine
what substantive rights the detainees have or whether their
substantive rights are adequately protected.16 As long as detainees
developments"); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479 (concluding that a subsequent case already
overruled "the statutory predicate to Eisentrageds holding").
25. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 605 (concluding that the law of war does not
recognize conspiracy to commit war crimes as an offense even though the
defendants in Quftin had been charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes
because the Court in Quifin had "declined to address whether the offense actually
qualified as a violation of the law").
26. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 ("It bears repeating that our opinion does
not address the content of the law that governs petitioners' detention. That is a
matter yet to be determined.").
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remain at Guantanamo, federal courts will be busy answering these
questions.
Because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that these basic
questions are undecided, I will address another open issue that has
received less attention. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court rejected
the Government's argument that federal courts could not exercise
habeas corpus jurisdiction over the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay because the base is located within the sovereign territory of
Cuba, a foreign country. 2' The Court held (arguably overruling
Eisentrager) that habeas corpus jurisdiction turns on functional
considerations rather than actual sovereignty.28  Applying a
functional test, the Court concluded that the federal courts could
exercise jurisdiction based largely on the following key factor: "The
detainees.., are held in a territory that, while technically not part
of the United States, is under the complete and total control of our
Government."'2 9
The Supreme Court, in my estimation, must not have
appreciated the full implications of making actual control of
territory rather than sovereignty the determinative factor for
habeas corpus jurisdiction. Indeed, this factor, if applied literally,
might have sweeping and problematic effects in the future. It
threatens to give almost any prisoner captured by the United States
in any likely future conflict a right to have a federal habeas corpus
petition heard.
This possible consequence bodes trouble because the United
States is the dominant military power in the world. When the
United States fights an enemy anywhere, our forces almost always
are quickly in "complete and total control" of the territory in which
they fight. For example, when the United States invaded Iraq in
2003, the Iraqi Government quickly collapsed. Although the
United States did not claim sovereignty over Iraq, it did become the
occupying power in total and complete control of the country.30
Similarly, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the
Taliban Government disintegrated, and the United States
27. Id. at 2248.
28. See id. at 2258. On the tension between Boumediene and Eisentrager, see id.
at 2298-302 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2262.
30. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO3/368/53/PDF/NO336853.pdf
(recognizing the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers in
Iraq).
2009] 5085
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temporarily took control.3' Likewise, our forces took no orders
from Serbia when occupying Kosovo in 1999.32
Under the functional approach of Boumediene, would any
prisoners taken during those invasions or other similar conflicts
have a right to habeas corpus in federal court? If so, this result
could be very problematic. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, for
example, the United States took over 50,000 Iraqi prisoners in just
three days. 33  The United States-and no one else-was in
complete control of the areas of Kuwait and Iraq where the United
States captured these prisoners. But surely the Supreme Court
would not hold that all of them would have a right to habeas
corpus. The federal courts would be overwhelmed. Yet, how the
Court would reach this result under its new functional test remains
to be seen.
10. What is the most important issue for American national security?
The most important legal issue in national security is what body
of law should regulate governmental responses to terrorism. As I
have described in a separate article, opponents of counterterrorism
measures typically argue that they should be judged by legal
guarantees designed to protect criminal suspects. 4  But
governments typically respond that they are not addressing mere
crime. 35 Instead, they are fighting a war against terrorism, and that
the law applicable to armed conflict should govern their actions.
These two bodies of law often point in different directions.
The police, for example, cannot simply shoot criminal suspects; the
36police have to try to arrest them first. But the military generally
can attack and kill enemy combatants-that's why targeted killing
31. In Afghanistan, unlike in Iraq, the United States quickly handed over
formal sovereignty to a transitional administration. See Grant T. Harris, The Era of
Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 1, 48-49 (2006).
32. The United States led a two-month air war against Serbia and then
occupied the Kosovo province with other NATO forces. See Joseph C. Sweeney,
The Just War Ethic in International Law, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1865, 1883 (2004).
33. See Eric Schmitt, War in the Gulf POW's; General's "Wild Guess" 50,000
Prisoners, So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al0.
34. Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Counterterrorism Measures Without
Characterizing Them as Law Enforcement of Military Action, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 661, 663
(2007).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 674.
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37
can occur. Similarly, the police cannot detain criminal suspects
without charges, but the military can hold enemy combatants as
prisoners for the duration of a conflict. 3 And while the police
cannot wiretap a criminal suspect's telephone calls without a
warrant, the military constantly eavesdrops on enemy
communications.
I do not believe that this important issue has a simple answer.
Modern terrorism resembles both criminal conduct and military
aggression. Likewise, the perpetrators of terrorism resemble both
criminals and combatants. Accordingly, good arguments may exist
for judging counterterrorism actions under criminal law standards
or judging them under the laws of war. Even seven years after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, a consensus view has not emerged.
My proposal for addressing this question is easily stated, but
certainly difficult to accomplish: we should develop a third body of
law to address counterterrorism efforts. 40 The laws regulating law
enforcement will apply to traditional crime fighting measures, the
laws of war will apply to traditional military actions, and this new
body of law would apply to government actions aimed at
suppressing terrorism and catching and punishing terrorists. This
body of law might resemble the rules governing law enforcement in
some respects and the laws of war in others. But the content of the
new body of law should be determined based on policy
considerations, not simply by analogizing terrorism to crime or
warfare.
37. Id. at 675-76.
38. Id. at 677-78.
39. Id. at 684-85.
40. Id. at 702-09.
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